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Abstract
In this paper a simultaneous-equations model of ﬁrm closing and wage
determination is developed in order to analyse how wages adjust to un-
favorable shocks that raise the risk of displacement through ﬁrm closing,
and to what extent a wage change aﬀects the exit likelihood. The results
show that the fear of job loss generates bargaining concessions instead of
compensating diﬀerentials. A novel result that emerges from this study
is that ﬁrms with a higher incidence of minimum wage earners are more
vulnerable to adverse demand shocks due to their inability to adjust wages
downward. In fact, minimum wage restrictions were seen to increase the
failure rates.
JEL classiﬁcation:J 3 1 ;J 6 5
Keywords: wages; displacement risk; concessions
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The extent of job destruction and, in particular, ﬁrm closing and job loss due
to sector reallocation, has been a matter of great concern in recent years, with
empirical research on gross job ﬂows experiencing a tremendous growth in the
past decade. The studies on the decomposition of net employment ﬂows em-
phasize the importance of job creation and job destruction through the entry
and exit of ﬁrms. According to Davis et al. (1996), about one-fourth of annual
job destruction in the U.S. takes places at plants that shutdown, while startups
account for one-sixth of annual job creation. In Portugal, annual job ﬂows pro-
duced by both plant births and plant deaths account for almost half of total
gross employment ﬂows (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001).
However, the literature on ﬂows of jobs is mostly employment accounting,
whereas wages/prices and ﬂuctuations in labor demand are never considered.
As pointed out by Hamermesh (1993): “...data on gross ﬂo w so fj o b st e l lu s
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1nothing directly about the magnitude of the wage or output elasticities of em-
ployment changes through the births and deaths of establishments, or growth
or contraction in existing establishments.”
Recently, a considerable number of studies have been examining how the
wages of displaced workers vary (over a long-term period) compared to workers
who are not displaced [see, among others, Jacobson et al. (1993), Stevens (1997)
and Margolis (1999)]. Nonetheless, few studies have yet analyzed how that wage
variation aﬀects the probability of displacement. In fact, the theoretical and
empirical research on the role of wages on plant closings is remarkably sparse.
Most of the empirical literature on plant closings has been concentrated on the
eﬀect of unions in the probability that a ﬁrm (plant) shuts down.1
Hamermesh (1988) was the ﬁrst who explicitly addressed this issue, devel-
oping a model in which workers and ﬁrms contract over wages and employment
probabilities. Since then empirical research in this area has not seen great im-
provement. The exceptions are the studies of Dunne and Roberts (1990) and
Blanchﬂower (1991).
Hamermesh (1988, 1991 and 1993) modeled the relationship between wage
changes and the probability of job displacement due to plant closing, in order
to determine the necessary wage concessions to keep plants from closing. The
model estimates also allowed him to compute the elasticity of labor demand
through plant closings.
The model is set within a theoretical contract framework in which workers
contract with their employers for a package that includes a probability that
the job will exist and a wage premium above the entry-level wage (reservation
wage). In fact, when workers sort themselves among ﬁrms, one of the risks they
consider is that exogenous product-market shocks may cause the ﬁrm to close
down. From the perspective of the contractual relationship between employers
and employees the role of joint investments in speciﬁc training may be viewed as
ab u ﬀer that can cushion against negative shocks and, thus, partially insulate the
ﬁrm from unfavorable market conditions. That is, since an internal labor market
may operate with employers and employees sharing the rents originated by ﬁrm-
speciﬁc human capital, the adjustment to negative shocks may be partially
absorbed through wage concessions. The possibility of wage concessions is, of
course, precluded if workers are paid legal minimum wages.
Hamermesh’s model has two main predictions. The ﬁrst points to a negative
relationship between the excess of wages over the reservation wage and the
probability of closing, suggesting that shocks that increase the probability of
displacement reduce the magnitude of the wage increase. The second points to
the existence of a positive relationship between the reservation wage and the
probability of closure due to the existence of compensating diﬀerentials for the
ex ante risk of displacement.
In order to test these predictions, Hamermesh (1998, 1991) used a longitu-
dinal household sample from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) that
1See Addison et al. (2002, pp. 23-24) for a summary of the international evidence of union
eﬀects on plant closings for Britain and the Unites States. Their own study is about the eﬀects
of worker representation on plant closings in Germany.
2includes 114 workers who left their previous job between 1977-81 because the
plant shut down, and 2,433 household heads who were not displaced during this
period. His results revealed that shocks that increase the probability of dis-
placement also signiﬁcantly reduce the wage increase. In other words, average
wages grow less rapidly in plants that will soon close, suggesting that ﬁrms’
adjustment to price shocks are partially absorbed into wages. Concerning the
second prediction of the model, no robust evidence was found in favor of the
existence of compensating diﬀerentials for the ex ante risk of displacement. In
fact, and contrary to what was expected, a negative coeﬃcient was found for
the reservation wage, a ﬁnding that Hamermesh interpreted as reﬂecting the
dominance of the income eﬀect of higher earnings on the demand for security.
Dunne and Roberts (1990) used a simultaneous-equations approach to ex-
amine how the probability of plant closing aﬀects the wage paid to employees
and how wages aﬀect the probability of closure. For this purpose they develop a
two-equation empirical model of plant failure and wage determination in order
to estimate both the compensating diﬀerential employees required for the risk of
plant closing and the eﬀect of wage changes on the probability of plant failure.
Using longitudinal data on over 6,500 manufacturing plants from the U.S.
Annual Survey of Manufactures for the years 1974-78, they found evidence in
favor of the existence of compensating diﬀerentials for the risk of displacement
due to plant closing. In fact, workers in a plant that has the average probability
of failure in the sample, earn 7.3% higher wages than workers with a zero prob-
ability of failure. This result, however, remains robust only for plants owned
by multi-plant ﬁrms. Finally, the results revealed that wage increases have lit-
tle eﬀect on the probability of plant failure. Indeed, a ten percent increase in
wages, holding plant revenue ﬁxed, increases the probability of failure by only
0.15 percentage points.
Using microdata on 5,300 individuals from the British Social Attitude Sur-
vey between 1983 and 1989, Blanchﬂower (1991) analyzed how the risk of unem-
ployment may aﬀect wages. He added to a classic Mincerian cross-section wage
equation a range of variables related to the extent of excess supply in the labor
market. One of these variables is a proxy for the risk of displacement due to
plant closure. Using a Nash bargaining framework he derived that wages should
be a declining function of the probability of ﬁrm closure.2 The empirical esti-
mates for the full sample revealed that workers who reported that they expected
their plant to close earn, on average, 8% less, ceteris paribus. This result seems
to suggest that, if anything, fear of job loss will generate bargaining concessions
instead of compensating diﬀerentials.
Some case studies also showed that unions may agree to moderate wage
demands if jobs are threatened, and if such moderation is likely to generate a
clear improvement in employment security [see, for example, Cappeli’s (1985)
case study in the meatpacking and tire industries]. As mentioned by Cappeli,
the possibility of shutdowns at the ﬁrm level may be a particular threat to em-
ployment security, because seniority systems that usually protect most workers
2For a demonstration of this prediction see Blanchﬂower (1991, Appendix A, pp. 492-494).
3from layoﬀs generally do not oﬀer protection against ﬁrm closings. In the face
of a ﬁrm shutdown insider workers are all equal.
In sum, the empirical research on the eﬀect of wages on ﬁrm closings (and
vice versa) is still in the beginning and looking for a solid stylized fact concerning
the relationship between wages and the risk of displacement. Do workers require
a compensating diﬀerential for the risk of displacement? Or, on the contrary,
are they able to accept wage moderation in order to avoid the ﬁrm’s shutdown?
Are wages an important determinant of ﬁrm exit?
Using a nationally representative data set that links employers and employ-
ees, this study will examine how wages adjust to a negative demand shock that
raises the risk of displacement through ﬁrm closing and to what extent a wage
change aﬀects the exit likelihood. The role of a mandatory minimum wage on
the ﬁrm’s exit decision will also be analyzed.
This work attempts to give an additional contribution to the empirical lit-
erature on wages and the risk of displacement on three distinct grounds. The
ﬁrst is related to the use of an appropriate and representative data set to ana-
lyze the relationship between wages and the risk of displacement. In fact, the
Portuguese data from Quadros de Pessoal (QP) can be described as a longitu-
dinally matched worker-ﬁrm sample with a rich set of information on workers’
characteristics, their wages, and their work environment. This will enable us
to address a number of questions that cannot be adequately answered in the
absence of ﬁrm or worker data.
The second is related to the use of a simultaneous-equations approach in
order to account for the possible endogeneity of wages and the probability of
displacement. As it seems clear that an increase in the ﬁrms’ failure rate may
aﬀect wage changes because it raises the risk of displacement, it also seems
clear that a wage change may aﬀect the exit likelihood because it reduces, all
else being equal, ﬁrm’s proﬁtability.
Third and ﬁnally, this study makes an important contribution by examining
the eﬀect of a mandatory minimum wage on the failure rate. Despite the great
eﬀort dedicated to research on the eﬀect of minimum wages on unemployment,
namely, youth unemployment, we are not aware of any study that explicitly
looks at the relationship between minimum wages and ﬁrms’ exits. Are ﬁrms
with a higher proportion of minimum wage earners more vulnerable to product
shocks due to their inability to adjust wages downward?
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the simultaneous-
equations model of ﬁrm closing and wages. In this Section we also develop the
basic hypothesis regarding which factors should matter for exit and discuss the
wage determinants. In Section 3 the data set is described. Section 4 reports the
empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
42 The Empirical Model of Firm Closing and
Wages
2.1 Purpose
The empirical model of ﬁrm closing and wages presented in this Section attempts
to tackle three diﬀerent questions. The ﬁrst is to examine how wages adjust to
a negative demand shock that raises the probability of displacement through
ﬁrm closing. The second is to determine how wages themselves aﬀect the exit
likelihood. The third is to analyze the eﬀect of a mandatory minimum wage on
the failure rate.
With respect to the ﬁrst issue, the objective is to examine if a higher risk of
displacement may lead workers to accept wage concessions or if, on the contrary,
that threat leads workers to demand a compensating diﬀerential. In fact, in the
face of a risk of layoﬀ two forces may be at work. First, workers may demand
higher wages in order to compensate them for the higher risk of displacement.
This is the prediction of the competitive model with its roots in Smith (1974).
Fear of unemployment has to be compensated, like any other disutility, with a
wage premium. Second, workers may accept wage moderation (concessions) in
order to avoid the ﬁrm closing and subsequent displacement. This hypothesis is
consistent with the idea that pay is ﬁx e di nab i l a t e r a lb a r g a i nw h e r et h ef e a r
of unemployment acts to weaken workers’ bargaining position [Blanchﬂower
(1991)]. If the ﬁrst force prevails a positive correlation between wages and the
probability of plant closing should be expected. Conversely, if it is the second
force that prevails, a negative correlation should be expected.
Concerning the second issue, the eﬀect of wages on ﬁrm’s proﬁtability, and
consequently on ﬁrm’s survival, is analyzed. The eﬀect of wage levels in the
probability of ﬁrm closing may be ambiguous. One would expect that all else
being equal, ﬁrms with lower wages would have higher expected proﬁts, and
thus be more likely to survive. However, high wages may simply be viewed as
mirroring high productivity and, thus, there might be no correlation.
In the third issue, particular attention will be devoted to the role of minimum
wages on ﬁrms’ closure. In fact, the adjustment to negative demand shocks may
be partially absorbed through wage concessions. Nonetheless, the possibility of
wage concessions is precluded if workers are paid legal minimum wages. Thus,
we examine if a mandatory minimum wage imposes severe restrictions in wages
adjustment to unfavorable demand shocks that may accelerate the ﬁrm’s exit
decision.
At this point the reasons that led to choosing a model of ﬁrm closing and
not plant closing should be mentioned. The option to use information at the
ﬁrm level instead of at the plant level is justiﬁed by two main reasons. First,
the important management bargaining decisions in a multi-plant ﬁrm are made
at the corporate level, not at the plant, and reﬂect the priorities of the ﬁrm as a
whole. In particular, wage policies are mainly relevant at the ﬁrm level. Second,
it seems that when it is the ﬁrm that is at risk of closing, the unemployment
5threat is stronger than when it is an establishment of a multi-plant ﬁrm. In
large multi-plant ﬁrms plant shutdowns may be used in addition to layoﬀsa s
a means of reducing capacity in the face of unfavorable shocks in the product
demand. A plant shutdown may even occur with no layoﬀs, as workers from
closing plants are reemployed in other plants of the same ﬁrm. Indeed, in some
situations the shutdown of a plant may be a less costly bargaining strategy and,
thus, would be preferable to a wage concession strategy. The empirical evidence
for Portugal suggests that due to higher adjustment costs (mainly the costs of
ﬁring workers) and in the face of unforeseen temporary shocks, it is preferable
to employers, under certain circumstances, to close down instead of adjusting
their level of employment by laying oﬀ workers [Blanchard and Portugal (2001)].
2.2 The Empirical Model
As mentioned above, the three main objectives of the empirical model of ﬁrm
closing and wages are:
(i) to examine how wages in period t-1 are aﬀected by a higher risk of
displacement due to a threat of ﬁrm closure in period t;
(ii) to examine the relationship between the wage paid to an individual
w o r k e ri nt h el a s ty e a ro nt h ej o b( p e r i o dt-1) and the probability that the ﬁrm
closes in the next year (period t);
(iii) to analyze whether a higher incidence of minimum wage earners in
period t-1 aﬀects the ﬁrm’s failure rate in period t.
The basic model consists of two equations. The ﬁrst describes the proba-





where Yijt =1if π∗
ijt < 0 and Yijt =0if π∗
ijt ≥ 0( 2 ) .
π∗
j is a latent variable reﬂecting the future proﬁtability of ﬁrm j. Xj is a
vector of ﬁrm characteristics, Zij a vector of worker characteristics and W∗
ij
the natural logarithm of the wage paid to worker i by ﬁrm j. Φ(WMi) denotes
the probability of a given worker receiving the minimum wage. α’s are the
parameters to be estimated and υ1ijt is a normally distributed random variable
with zero mean and unit variance.
The second equation of the model is a conventional human capital wage
equation with controls for local labor market conditions and some ﬁrm charac-




where Wijt−1 = Max(WMit−1,W∗
ijt−1) and WMit−1 is the mandatory minimum
wage in period t − 1.
6The wage paid to worker i in ﬁrm j is a function of a set of workers’ char-
acteristics included in vector Vij, ﬁrm and local labor market characteristics
deﬁn e di nv e c t o rUj and π∗
ij. In the data it is not possible to observe π∗
ij.A l l
we can say is whether π∗
ij is or is not below a given threshold (the minimum level
of proﬁts that guarantees the ﬁrm’s continued existence). In the latter case, the
ﬁrm will continue its operations, otherwise it will close down. Thus, the proba-
bility of displacement through ﬁrm closing is deﬁned as Pijt ≡ Pr(π∗
ijt < 0).β ’s
are the unknown parameters to be estimated and υ2ijt is a normally distributed
random variable (zero mean and constant variance).
The dependent variable in the failure equation is a binary variable that takes
the value of one if the worker was displaced in year t due to ﬁrm closure, zero
otherwise. A set of ﬁrm variables that may aﬀect the ﬁrm’s decision to close
are identiﬁed below.
In order to control the exogenous demand shocks that may aﬀect the prob-
ability of ﬁrm closing, the average growth rate of real sales in the last three
y e a r si su s e da sap r o x yf o rﬁrm-speciﬁcs h o c k s . 3 Controlling for ﬁrm-speciﬁc
(idiosyncratic) shocks enables one to examine if, in the face of an identical ex-
ogenous shock, and all else being equal, ﬁrms with lower wages are less likely to
close down or not.
Even though ﬁrm or sectoral demand shifts certainly aﬀe c tt h er a t eo fﬁrm
closing, other forces are also at work. Jovanovic (1982) showed that patterns
of employer growth and ﬁrm (plant) failure are consistent with a process of
within-industry selection in which ineﬃcient producers decline and fail. This
selection process leads to substantial variation in the probability of exit across
ﬁrms (plants) within an industry. In fact, while plant deaths are part of the
normal process of the entry and exit of ﬁrms, the post-entry patterns of growth
and failure vary considerably with observed employers’ characteristics [Dunne
et al. (1989)]. This reasoning suggests that the risk of displacement due to
ﬁrm closing varies not only with the demand for the ﬁrm’s output but also with
employer’s eﬃciency relative to competing ﬁrms in the same industry. Being so,
as e to fﬁrm’s characteristics that are related to its performance in the output
market may aﬀect the ﬁrm’s own probability of survival. The factors to be
included in the empirical model as exit determinants will now be identiﬁed.
With the exception of past sales growth, all variables are measured in the year
that precedes the potential exit event (period t-1).
It has been largely shown in the empirical literature on ﬁrm survival that
ﬁrm size and age are negatively associated with failure rates [see, for example,
Kumar (1985), Evans (1987), Hall (1987), Dunne et al. (1989), Audretsch
and Mahmood (1994), Mata and Portugal (1994) and Mata et al. (1995)].
These results are consistent with Jovanovic’s (1982) model of industry evolution,
a c c o r d i n gt ow h i c hﬁrms start with no knowledge about their eﬃciency. As
time goes by and ﬁrms observe their performance in the output market, they
gradually learn about their eﬃciency. This information is then incorporated
3Sales in year t correspond to annual sales of the previous year. Sales were deﬂated using
the CPI (base=1991).
7into their current size. Eﬃcient ﬁrms grow and survive, while ineﬃcient ones
contract and fail. Thus, large and old ﬁrms are successful ﬁrms, and, for this
reason, they should have higher survival probabilities.
Thus, measures of the size and age of the ﬁrm are included in the failure
equation. The size of the ﬁrm is deﬁned as the natural logarithm of its total
employment. Since the information about the date of a ﬁrm’s creation is only
available after 1993, and in order to use the same criteria to measure age in
the 1993-95 period, we used as a proxy for ﬁrm age the tenure (in years) of the
worker with the longest tenure within the plant. A linear spline function is used
to deﬁne the eﬀect of the age of the ﬁrm.
The ﬁrm’s market share is used as a measure of product market competition.
Monopoly power generates monopoly rents and consequently higher proﬁts. If
employers are able to appropriate part of these rents, it should be expected that
ﬁrms with increased market share are less likely to fail. The market share is
obtained by the ratio between a ﬁrm’s sales and total (5 digit) sector’s sales.
Firm ownership characteristics may aﬀect the exit likelihood. Two indicators
of ownership type will be used, namely the number of establishments with which
each ﬁrm operates and the proportion of foreign capital. For the former a
dummy variable that takes the value one if the ﬁrm is a multi-plant ﬁrm (0
otherwise) will be included in the model. Single-plant ﬁrms are far less likely to
s h u t d o w nap l a n tt h a nam u l t i - p l a n tﬁrm, since single-plant operations can be
viewed as having greater closing costs as they involve the exit of the own ﬁrm.
Therefore, plants in multi-unit ﬁrms have higher probability of closing. The
empirical evidence has been showing that multi-plant ﬁrms use the shutdown
margin more often than their single-plant counterparts [see, for instance, Mata
and Portugal (1994), Machin (1995) and the recent studies of Addison et al.
(2002) and Bernard and Jensen (2002)]. On the contrary and analogously,
multi-plant ﬁrms are far less likely to close than single-plant ﬁrms.
The proportion of foreign capital may itself be an indicator of unobserved
quality of the ﬁrm and may aﬀect the probability of closure. Doms and Jensen
(1998) found that multinational plants have superior observable characteristics.
However, it is also well known that multinationals have a higher propensity to
relocate production within ﬁrms, which may lead to an increased probability of
closure [see, for example, Harris and Hassaszadeh (2002)].
If analyzing the eﬀects of individual wage levels on the probability of ﬁrm
closing, it is necessary to have a measure of revenue per employee in order to be
able to compare ﬁrms. Firms that have higher variable costs, holding revenue
ﬁxed, are less likely to cover their ﬁxed costs in the long-run and thus more
likely to close down. Real sales per worker (in logs) is used as a measure of
ﬁrm’s revenue per employee.
Finally, among the ﬁrm’s characteristics, a set of industry (one-digit)4 and
regional dummies (NUTs II)5 are also included in the failure equation. Since
the data include ﬁrm closures that occurred in 1994, 1995 and 1996, three time
4At one-digit level there are nine sectors according to the Portuguese Classiﬁcation of
Economic Activities (CAE).
5At NUTs II mainland Portugal is split into 5 geographical areas.
8dummies were also added to the model in order to control for macroeconomic
conditions.
Previous studies such as Cooper et al. (1994) and Mata and Portugal (2002)
found human capital to be a good predictor of ﬁrm survival. We also consider
the possibility that human capital aﬀects the ﬁrm’s performance and hence its
failure rate, and include a set of variables that characterize workers’ skills and
that identify the composition of the ﬁrm’s workforce with respect to schooling,
tenure (and its square), age and gender. The variable gender takes the value
one for females and zero for males. The variable education is measured as the
number of years of schooling completed and tenure is deﬁned as the number
of years with the current employer. The variable age is deﬁned as a dummy
variable that equals one if the individual belongs to each age group out of the
four considered: less than 25, 25-34, 35-54 and more than 54 (the omitted
category).
The dependent variable in the wage equation is deﬁned as the natural log-
arithm of the real monthly base wage paid to an individual worker in the year
that precedes the displacement. The monthly base wage was deﬂated by the
Consumer Price Index (CPI; base=1991).
The wage equation includes a set of controls for personal characteristics
such as: gender, education, age (and its square), tenure (and its square) and
qualiﬁcation level. A set of dummies are used for the levels of qualiﬁcation.
Seven categories are considered: manager and highly professional, professional,
supervisors, highly skilled and skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled, non-deﬁned (a
residual category) and apprentices (the reference category).
In order to assure that the eﬀect of a higher risk of unemployment on wages is
due to ﬁrm shutdown and not to diﬀerences in the risk of layoﬀ in the local labor
markets, the local unemployment rate is used to control for those diﬀerences.
The local unemployment rate is deﬁned at the disaggregated level of NUTs III.6
The ﬁrm characteristics included in the wage equation are the ﬁrm size, sales
per worker and a set of industry (one-digit)7 and regional (NUTs II) dummies.
In order to account for macroeconomic conditions time dummies are also added
to the model.
6It should be noted that for the period of analysis of this study (1993-95), unemployment
rates are only deﬁned at the regional level at NUTs II. In order to have a proxy for unemploy-
ment at a more disaggregated level of NUTs III (28 geographical areas for mainland), the ratio
between annual job applications registered in each employment center and total employment
(deﬁned at NUTs III using data from QP) will be used.
The information on job applications registered in each employment center was obtained
from Monthly Statistics - Institute for Employment and Vocational Training (IEFP).
7In this case we employ just 7 sectoral dummies, since the sector of Electricity, Gas and
Water, that accounts for a few number of non-displaced workers, was excluded because no
plant closings were observed in this sector.
93T h e D a t a
The data set used in this study was obtained from Quadros de Pessoal (QP) and
includes all workers that lost their jobs in 1994, 1995 or 1996 due to ﬁrm closure
and were present in the QP registers in the year that preceded the displacement.
A control group constituted by a random sample of workers who were employed
in the year prior to the displacement in ﬁrms that did not close in the following
year is also included.
The survey has three characteristics that make it particularly suitable for the
analysis of the relationship between wages and the risk of ﬁrm closing. First, it
covers all ﬁrms employing paid labor in Portugal.8 Second, it has a longitudinal
dimension which allows us to follow ﬁrms and individuals over time. Third, it
contains information on both ﬁrms and its workers.
To be sure that exits are accurately identiﬁed, we required that a ﬁrm be
absent from the QP two or more consecutive years in order to be classiﬁed
as a closure. Additionally, and to avoid the inclusion of false exits, workers
that appeared in the database in the period after displacement with a year of
admission in the new job less than the year of displacement minus one were
dropped.9
In order to be allowed to construct the variables that account for ﬁrm’s
recent evolution, we impose that workers be present in the QP registers in each
of the three years that preceded the ﬁrm shutdown and employed with the
same employer over those years.10 This requirement means that an individual
must have at least two years of tenure in the year prior to displacement. This
selection rule, although primarily dictated by data availability considerations,
results in an analysis sample of stably employed individuals. On average, the
sampled individuals have 26 years of labor force experience and over 11 years
of employer tenure.
We also limited the sample to full-time workers aged between 18 and 64 in
the year prior to displacement. Since the minimum wage is deﬁned as a monthly
wage, the full-time job requirement allows to identify minimum wage earners
more accurately. In this context, wages are measured as monthly wages.
We have also excluded those individuals for which information was incom-
plete for the year before displacement, namely those with zero wage.11 Finally,
a n di no r d e rt om i n i m i z et h ee ﬀects of the presence of outliers, we drop the 0.1%
top and the 0.1% bottom observations for the wage and sales variables.
After these exclusions we obtained a sample of 35,922 full-time workers that
were displaced between 1994-96 due to ﬁrm closing, aged between 18-64 and
8Thus, this source does not cover operated family businesses without wage-earning em-
ployees and self-employment. Public administration is also excluded.
9If, for example, a worker’s displacement year is 1994 and he (she) appears in the database
in the post-displacement period with a year of admission in the new job of 1992 or less, he
(she) is excluded from the sample.
10Hence, for workers displaced in 1994 the data should be available for the 1991-93 period,
for workers displaced in 1995 for the period of 1992-94 and for workers displaced in 1996 for
the 1993-95 period.
11For the three years before displacement in the case of the variable sales.
10with at least two years of tenure in the year prior to displacement.
The control group includes three sub-samples and was constructed in the
following way. For each year prior to the displacement year we obtained a
random sample of around 300,000 workers that were employed in ﬁrms that did
not close.12 For each of these three groups we excluded those individuals that
were not present in the QP ﬁles in each of the three years before displacement
and those who were not employed in the same ﬁrm over those years. The sample
was also limited to full-time workers aged between 18-64 in the year prior to
displacement. After excluding those observations with missing values on the
explanatory variables and the extreme observations (outliers) for wages and
sales, we obtained a control group of 230,102 non-displaced workers.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample for the two groups
of workers: displaced and non-displaced. As can be seen in Table 1, on average,
displaced workers are slightly younger, less qualiﬁed and with fewer years of
tenure and education. They also earn, on average, less than non-displaced
workers. The pool of displaced workers includes more females and minimum
wage earners.
According to ﬁrms’ characteristics, the proportion of displaced workers that
comes from small, young and single-plant ﬁr m si sh i g h e rw h e nc o m p a r e dt ot h e
sample of non-displaced workers. For the former the real average growth rate of
ﬁrms’ sales in the last three years is negative (-7.6%), while for the latter that
same rate is positive (1.4%). Displaced workers are also employed in ﬁrms with
a reduced market power (measured by market share).
12The sample was drawn according to a normal random number generator.
11Table 1: Sample Characteristics (Means and Standard Deviations)
Displaced Non-displaced
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Workers’ Characteristics
Age (in years) 37.3 0.113 38.5 0.107
Tenure (in years) 9.8 0.082 11.9 0.085
Education (in years) 5.8 2.830 6.4 3.231
Proportion of Female 0.442 0.368
Proportion of Minimum Wage Earners 0.143 0.056
Qualiﬁcation Levels (proportion of workers)
Manager and Highly Professional 0.018 0.029
Professional 0.017 0.031
Supervisors 0.051 0.057
Highly Skilled and Skilled 0.527 0.543




Size (total employment) 108.4 426.2 1135.1 2701.2
Past Sales Growth -0.076 0.391 0.014 0.354
Market Share 0.013 0.060 0.118 0.250
Proportion of Foreign Capital 0.031 0.161 0.094 0.269
Proportion of Multi-plant Firms 0.165 0.413
Firm Age (proportion of workers)
2-5 years 0.134 0.046
6-10 years 0.181 0.086
> 10 years 0.685 0.869
Real Sales per Worker (in logs) 8.419 1.111 8.825 1.172
Real Monthly Wage (in logs) 10.973 0.432 11.175 0.490
Number of Observations 35,922 230,102
Notes: (i) all variables, except past sales growth, are measured in the year prior to
displacement; (ii) sales per worker and the monthly wage are in 1991 PTE (escudo);
1E U R ≡200.482 PTE.
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4.1 Estimation Method
In order to estimate the simultaneous-equations model of ﬁrm closing and wages
presented in Section 2, it will be necessary to choose an adequate method of
estimation. It is well known that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is
generally inconsistent when applied to a structural equation in a simultaneous-
equations system.
Beyond this diﬃculty, our empirical model of ﬁrm closing and wages has a
particularity, since one of the endogenous variables is a binary variable while
the other is a censored variable. In fact, while the failure equation is speciﬁed
as a probit model, the wage equation is a tobit model with lower censoring at
the minimum wage. Thus, we are in the presence of a simultaneous-equations
model with mixed dichotomous and censored variables.
The conventional method for estimating simultaneous-equations models is
the method of instrumental variables. As suggested by Maddala (1983, p. 246),
a two-stage procedure will allow us to estimate a two-equation model in which
one of the variables is censored while the other is only observed as a dichotomous
variable. The two-stage estimation method involves the following steps. The
ﬁrst step is to write the reduced-forms equations for the endogenous variables.
Next, estimate the reduced-forms equations and keep the predicted values. Fi-
nally, estimate the structural equations replacing the endogenous variables by
the predicted values obtained from the reduced-forms regressions.
The empirical model deﬁned by equations (1) to (3) speciﬁes both the prob-
ability of closure and wages as endogenous. Hence, the reduced form of the
equation system in the latent variables is:
π∗
ijt = Π1Kijt−1 +ε1ijt,Y ijt =1 ( π∗
ijt < 0) (4),
W∗
ijt−1 = Π2Kijt−1+ε2ijt−1,W ijt−1 = Max(WMit−1,W∗
ijt−1)( 5 ) .
where K includes all the exogenous variables in X,Z,U and V .
The reduced-form parameters can be estimated by applying maximum like-
lihood to the probit and tobit models in equations (4) and (5), respectively.
Estimating the reduced-form for π∗
ijt by the probit method will allow us
to obtain the predicted probability of displacement through ﬁrm closing, b P.
Estimating the reduced-form for W∗
ijt−1 by the tobit method will enable us
to obtain the predicted value of the monthly wage (c W∗) and the estimated
probability that a given observation is a limit observation, Φ(d WM). In other
words, Φ(d WM) measures the estimated probability of a given worker receiving
the minimum wage.
This procedure is unconventional, but provides a simple and elegant solution
to the speciﬁcation of the two sources of endogeneity from wages to failure rates.
On the one side, the impact of the level of wages on the chances of ﬁrm closure.
13And, on the other side, the inﬂuence of minimum wage restrictions on the ability
to accommodate negative shocks.
The structural wage equation is estimated in the second-stage tobit after re-
placing the probability of displacement through ﬁrm closing (P) by its predicted
value ( b P). The structural failure equation is estimated in the second-stage pro-
bit after replacing the monthly wage (W∗) by its predicted value (d W∗)a n da f t e r
including the estimated probability of being a minimum wage earner, Φ(d WM).
This last procedure will enable us to examine the eﬀect of a mandatory minimum
wage on the failure rate.
4.2 Empirical Results
The parameter estimates of the simultaneous-equations model of ﬁrm closing
and wages are presented in Tables 2 (structural failure equation) and 3 (struc-
tural wage equation).13 The estimation strategy consists of having, as far as
possible, a complete set of controls to examine whether a robust association
between wages and the probability of ﬁrm closing (and vice-versa)c a nb ei d e n -
tiﬁed. The variables that characterize employers’ performance such as past sales
growth, ﬁrm age, market share, multi-plant ﬁrm and proportion of foreign cap-
ital contribute to the identiﬁcation of the wage equation.14 In the structural
probit model of ﬁrm closing, the regional unemployment rate and the qualiﬁca-
tion levels are omitted.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 report results (coeﬃcients estimates and mar-
ginal eﬀects, respectively) for a speciﬁcation in which the probability of ﬁrm
closing depends on an extensive set of ﬁrm characteristics, the skill composi-
tion of the workforce, monthly wages (predicted) and the estimated probability
of being a minimum wage earner. A range of dummy variables for industries,
regions and years are also included.
According to Table 2, past sales growth, ﬁrm size and age, market share,
multi-plant ﬁrm, proportion of foreign capital and sales per worker are signiﬁ-
cantly correlated with the probability of ﬁrm closing. In particular, the results
reveal that ﬁrms experiencing a decline in sales growth are clearly more likely
to close. This seems to imply that sales contraction can be used as a strong pre-
dictor of ﬁrm failure. Indeed, the fact that a ﬁrm has grown in the past signals
that it has been performing well. Moreover, the estimates reported in Table
2 show that small ﬁrms are clearly more likely to close than large ﬁrms. This
result is conventional enough and, in particular, is in line with the one obtained
for Portugal in the study of Mata et al. (1995) using a sample of newly born
manufacturing plants.
13The econometric results were obtained using LIMDEP version 8.0. In both equations the
t-ratios correspond to the corrected covariance matrix for the two-step estimator using the
methodology developed by Murphy and Topel (1985).
14The exceptions are ﬁrm size and sales per worker, since these variables constitute an
important determinant of individual wages as well.
14The estimates of the coeﬃcients on ﬁrm’s age using splines indicate a neg-
ative and signiﬁcant eﬀect of age on the probability of displacement. However,
after a decade the negative eﬀect of age starts to vanish, becoming positive for
very old ﬁrms (more than 53 years).
The variable market share has a strong negative eﬀect on the probability of
closing, suggesting that monopoly power generates rents that may function as
ab u ﬀer that cushions against negative shocks.
As expected, workers that are part of a multi-plant ﬁrm are less likely to be
displaced due to ﬁrm closing than workers that are part of a single-plant ﬁrm.
The same is true for workers that are part of ﬁrms with a large proportion of
foreign-owned capital.
Sales per worker, a proxy for productivity, have a negative impact on the
probability of ﬁrm closing. Thus, low productivity ﬁrms, all else being equal,
are more likely to close down.
Concerning the variables that identify the composition of the ﬁrm’s work-
force, the estimates show that ﬁrms with a higher proportion of female, older,
less-educated and less-tenured workers are more likely to close. In particular,
we should mention the negative eﬀect of tenure on the probability of closure. As
long as higher tenure reﬂects higher investments in speciﬁc training and/or bet-
ter matches (that is, job matches that enhance productivity), joint investments
in speciﬁc training may also be viewed as a buﬀer than can cushion against
negative shocks and, thus, partially insulate the ﬁrm from unfavorable market
conditions. Hence, a negative relationship should be expected between worker’s
tenure and the probability of ﬁrm closing. In this context, we interpret the
positive coeﬃcient estimate associated with the gender variable as an indication
that females engage in on-the-job training investments less intensively than do
males.
High-wage paying ﬁrms face higher hazard rates than low-paying ﬁrms, ce-
teris paribus. After controlling for an extensive set of employers’ characteristics
and for the skill composition of the workforce, the results reveal that ﬁrms that
pay higher wages, holding revenue per employee ﬁxed, are less likely to survive.
In fact, the marginal eﬀect of a 1% increase on monthly wages in the proba-
bility of displacement is 0.00029 (see column 2 of Table 2). Since the average
job displacement rate through ﬁrm closing in the population is around 6.3%, a
1% wage increase is associated with a 0.46% increase in the probability of job
displacement through ﬁrm closing.
Finally, the two-step probit results report a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of
the probability of receiving the minimum wage on the failure rate, suggesting
that ﬁrms with a higher incidence of minimum wage workers face higher exit
rates than those with a smaller incidence. A one point increase in the pro-
portion of minimum wage earners increases the probability of displacement by
0.014 percentage points. Since, on average, the proportion of minimum wage
earners in the population is around 13% and the average job displacement rate
is 6.3%, a 10% increase in the proportion of minimum wage earners increases
the probability of displacement through ﬁrm closing by 0.29%.
In fact, the possibility of wage concessions is precluded if workers are paid
15legal minimum wages. Thus, ﬁrms with a higher proportion of minimum wage
earners may have lower chances of survival due to their inability to adjust wages
downward in the face of a negative demand shock.
16Table 2: Failure Equation - Two-step Probit Results
Full-time Workers (N=266024)
Dependent variable: displaced=1
Variables Coeﬃcient Marginal Eﬀect
Past Sales Growth -0.323 -0.049
(-30.5)









Market Share -1.383 -0.208
(-28.1)
Multi-plant Firm -0.069 -0.010
(-7.2)
Proportion of Foreign Capital -0.245 -0.037
(-13.3)















Tenure/100 Squared 4.559 0.687
(10.2)
Monthly Wage (predicted) 0.191 0.029
(6.5)







Notes: (i) a set of industry, regional and time dummies are included in the speciﬁcation;
(ii) AgeS5=(Age-5) if Age>5, 0 otherwise; AgeS10=(Age-10) if Age>10, 0 otherwise;
(iii) t-ratios are in parentheses;
(iv) all estimates are signiﬁcant at 1%, except those with an *.
Table 3 reports the two-step tobit results of the wage equation. The basic
speciﬁcation includes a set of controls for workers’ characteristics, ﬁrm size and
sales per worker as two important determinants of individual wages, the local
unemployment rate and the instrumented probability of displacement due to
ﬁrm closing. A set of industry, regional and time dummies are also included in
the speciﬁcation. All the exogenous variables are statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% level of signiﬁcance and have the expected signs.
The eﬀect of the probability of closing on monthly wages is negative and also
statistically signiﬁcant. This implies that a worker employed in a ﬁrm that will
close earns less in the year prior to displacement than a similar worker employed
in a non-closing ﬁrm. Converting the coeﬃcient of -0.459 to an elasticity results
in a value of -0.029 evaluated at the mean failure rate in the sample. In other
words, workers in a ﬁrm that has the average probability of failure in the popu-
lation (6.3%), earn (one year prior to closing) around 3% less than workers in a
ﬁrm with zero probability of failure (a useful artiﬁcial benchmark).15 This em-
pirical result indicates the existence of wage concessions for workers employed
in ﬁrms with a higher probability of failing.
This empirical evidence seems to contradict the theoretical prediction that
workers employed in ﬁrms with a higher probability of displacement require a
compensating diﬀerential for the risk of layoﬀ. The compensating diﬀerential
for the ex ante risk of displacement may exist. The evidence of a positive rela-
tionship between wage levels and failure rates reported in the probit equation is
consistent with the existence of higher wages due to compensating diﬀerentials,
that may accelerate in the short-run the process of closure.16 However, the
results obtained from the wage equation seem to suggest that in the face of an
ex post risk of displacement the compensating diﬀerential for the risk of layoﬀ
is oﬀset by the need to moderate wages in order to avoid the ﬁrm’s shutdown.
15If c W1 is the predicted wage in a ﬁrm with an average failure probability of 0.063 and
c W0 is the predicted wage in a ﬁrm that has no probability of failing, then the relative wage
diﬀerential is calculated as ln( c W1/ d W0)=[ ( −0.459) ∗ (0.063)] = −0.029.
16Since in the basic speciﬁcation of Table 2 a control for tenure in the job was included, we
can interpret the individual monthly wage as the worker’s reservation wage.
18Table 3: Wage Equation - Two-step Tobit Results
Full-time Workers (N=266024)
Dependent variable: log of real monthly wage











Tenure/100 Squared -0.492 -0.472
(-5.3)
Qualiﬁcation Levels






Highly Skilled and Skilled 0.198 0.190
(43.5)




Firm Size 0.016 0.016
(23.8)
Sales per Worker 0.070 0.067
(90.2)
Regional Unemployment Rate -0.060 -0.058
(-35.9)






Notes: (i) a set of industry, regional and time dummies are included in the speciﬁcation;
(ii) t-statistics are in parentheses;
(iii) all estimates are signiﬁcant at 1%, except those with an *.
195C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have investigated how wages adjust to unfavorable shocks that
raise the risk of displacement through ﬁrm closing, and to what extent a wage
change aﬀects the exit likelihood. For this purpose, a simultaneous-equations
model was applied to a large longitudinally linked employer-employee data set
of workers displaced due to ﬁrm closing. Three main conclusions emerge from
this exercise.
First, after controlling for employers’ heterogeneity and the skill composition
of the workforce, the results indicated that wages have a strong and positive
impact on the failure rate. High-wage paying ﬁrms face higher exit rates than
low-paying ﬁrms, ceteris paribus. Indeed, a 1% increase in monthly wages raises
the probability of displacement through ﬁrm closing by 0.46%.
Second, a negative and strong eﬀect of the probability of closing on wages
was found, favoring the hypothesis that the risk of unemployment depresses
wages. Workers employed in ﬁrms at risk earn 3% less one year prior to closing
than workers in ﬁrms with no risk of closure. This robust empirical evidence
reinforces the hypothesis that instead of requiring a compensating diﬀerential
for a higher risk of displacement, workers in ﬁrms at risk are able to agree upon
wage concessions/moderation in order to avoid the ﬁrm’s shutdown.
Third, minimum wage restrictions were seen to increase the failure rates. A
high proportion of minimum wage earners in a ﬁrm may preclude the possibility
of wage concessions in response to unfavorable shocks, and thus accelerate the
exit decision. In other words, ﬁrms with a higher incidence of minimum wage
earners are more vulnerable to adverse demand shocks due to their inability
to adjust wages downward. In fact, beyond the direct eﬀect of wages on the
failure rate, a 10% increase in the incidence of minimum wage earners (around
1.3 percentage points) raises the probability of displacement by 0.29%.
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